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Case study — Identity lab exercise, EPITA

Identity & access management: configuring Okta against ISO/IEC 27001, not intuition

It’s easy to configure an identity provider by gut feel — “require MFA, set a reasonable timeout, move on.” This exercise took a stricter approach: build an Okta Workforce Identity Cloud environment where every setting is deliberately traced back to a specific ISO/IEC 27001 Annex A control, so the configuration is defensible, not just plausible.

12

ISO 27001 controls mapped to config

12 chars

Minimum enforced password length

8h / 8min

Max session / idle timeout

Every sign-in

MFA required, no exceptions

01

Identity foundations: unique IDs, split roles

Three distinct accounts were created — an admin (Alice), a standard employee (Bob), and an external contractor (Harry) — alongside a personal administrator account. Giving every person a unique identity satisfies ISO A.9.2.1 (User Registration) for accountability; deliberately keeping the admin role separate from the standard employee accounts demonstrates A.6.1.2 (Segregation of Duties) — no single account should combine super-user power with everyday use.

02

Passwords and MFA: no password-only path

The password policy enforces a 12-character minimum with upper/lower case, numeric, and symbol complexity, a 5-password history to block reuse, a 90-day expiry, and a lockout after 10 failed attempts — satisfying A.9.4.3(Password Management) and reducing brute-force viability directly. On top of that, a custom “ISO 27001 Policy” authentication rule requires password + a second factor on every single sign-in — not just the first one per session — closing the gap left by relying on a password alone (A.9.4.2, Secure Log-on Procedures).

03

Sessions and devices: limiting the blast radius

The Global Session Policy caps sessions at 8 hours with an 8-minute idle timeout, so an unattended, signed-in workstation doesn’t stay a live session indefinitely (A.11.2.8, Clear Desk and Clear Screen; A.9.4.2). A Device Assurance policy goes a step further and gates access on the device itself: Windows 11 (25H2 or newer), Windows Hello enabled, and disk encryption required — so a stolen or unencrypted laptop simply can’t authenticate, regardless of whether the credentials are correct (A.6.2.1, A.9.1.2).

04

Collecting less, on purpose

Self-service registration is denied, and the profile-enrollment form collects exactly three fields — email, first name, last name — nothing more. That’s a deliberate application of data minimization under A.18.1.4(Privacy and Protection of PII): the fewer optional fields an identity system holds, the smaller the organization’s exposure if that system is ever compromised.

05

Watching the network, not just the login

Okta ThreatInsight is enabled to log authentication attempts from IPs exhibiting known-malicious behavior (A.13.1, A.5.7), and every sensitive account event — password changes, new sign-ons, authenticator resets — triggers a notification email, with a built-in path for users to report activity they don’t recognize (A.16.1, Incident Management). Identity security doesn’t stop at the login screen; it includes making sure the right people find out when something changes.

06

The full control mapping

Every configuration decision in this environment traces back to a named clause, not a hunch:

A.9.2.1 User registration (unique IDs)

A.6.1.2 Segregation of duties

A.9.4.3Password complexity & history

A.9.4.2 Secure log-on / MFA / session timeouts

A.11.2.8 Clear desk / clear screen

A.6.2.1 Mobile device policy (disk encryption)

A.9.1.2 Access to networks (device assurance)

A.18.1.4Privacy & data minimization

A.13.1 Network security management

A.16.1 Incident management (notifications)