Case study — Group lab project, EPITA
SOC & observability platform: what standard thresholds miss
A six-person Red Team vs. Blue Team lab: deploy a cloud-based attacker and target on AWS, wire the target into a Wazuh SIEM, then run four real attack scenarios against it — from silent reconnaissance to a full brute-force compromise — and prove each one gets caught, correlated, and explained.
4
Attack scenarios, 4 custom detections
Wazuh
Cloud SIEM / XDR platform
Lvl 10
Highest-severity custom alert
1 attempt
Reconnaissance caught before brute-force
The lab environment
A single AWS VPC hosts two EC2 instances in the same subnet — an Ubuntu 22.04 target and a Kali Linux attacker — with outbound access to a managed Wazuh Cloud environment acting as SIEM. The Wazuh agent on the target forwards system logs (journald, auth.log), package-manager logs, and firewall logs to the cloud manager, where rules and decoders correlate raw events into alerts on the dashboard. Nothing here is simulated data — every alert in this case study came from an actual attack run against the actual box.
Four scenarios, four detections
1. Suspicious package installation Rule 100300 · Level 8
Attackers commonly install extra tools (netcat, nmap) right after compromising a host, to widen their foothold. A custom rule watches /var/log/dpkg.log for exactly that, capturing the package name and timestamp so an analyst can tell a scheduled update from an unauthorized change at a glance.
2. Unauthorized SSH access, non-existing user Rule 100501 · Level 8
Standard brute-force detection triggers on a threshold — five or more failed attempts against a real account. That misses a quieter attack: probing whether a username itselfis valid, which shows up as a single failed login against an account that was never real. A custom rule matches on the underlying “failed password for invalid user” signature and fires on the very first attempt — visibility standard rules don’t give you.
3. Critical file modification (FIM + privilege escalation)
With shell access gained, the attacker runs sudo nano /etc/passwd to plant a backdoor account. Two rules fire at once: Wazuh’s File Integrity Monitoring catches the checksum change on /etc/passwd (Rule 550), while a separate rule flags the successful sudo to root (Rule 5402). Neither alert alone tells the full story — the Threat Hunting dashboard lets an analyst pull both into one timeline and see the exact command that did it.
4. Initial access via SSH brute force Rule 100002 · Level 10 (Critical)
A Hydra dictionary attack against the target — six password attempts, one hit. The alert that matters isn’t “failed login”, it’s the pattern: a run of failures immediately followed by a success on the same account. A dedicated critical-level rule distinguishes that sequence from routine login noise and surfaces the compromised username and the attacker’s source IP in the same alert.
Why the custom rule for use case 2 mattered
This was the most instructive scenario, not the loudest one. Off-the-shelf brute-force detection is threshold-based by design — it waits for volume. That’s exactly the wrong model for username enumeration, where an attacker only needs one attempt per guess and never repeats a username twice. Building a rule around the underlying failure signature, rather than a count, is what caught the reconnaissance phase at all.
<!-- Custom rule: fires on a single attempt, not a threshold -->
<rule id="100501" level="8">
<if_matched_sid>5710</if_matched_sid>
<description>Unauthorized SSH access attempt (non-existing user)</description>
</rule>Correlation is the actual product
The clearest lesson from the lab: a single failed login or a single file change looks benign in isolation. It’s only when the SIEM links a sudo event to the exact file-integrity change it caused — same host, same second, same session — that it becomes an actionable forensic narrative instead of two unrelated log lines an analyst has to connect by hand.